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In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely implicational fragment of Intu-
itionistic Logic (M→ ) is PSPACE-complete. He showed a polynomially bounded translation from
full Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness
of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Gœdel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic Logic, the PSPACE-
completeness of M→ is drawn. The sub-formula principle for a deductive system for a logic L
states that whenever {γ1, . . . ,γk} `L α there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is ei-
ther a sub-formula of α or of some of γi. In this work we extend Statman’s result and show that
any propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular formulation of the sub-
formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes the minimal purely implicational logic then
it is PSPACE-complete. As a consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL
and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular sub-formula
principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our technique can be used to prove
that any finitely many-valued logic has the set of its tautologies in PSPACE.
1 Introduction
In [17], R. Statman showed a polynomial-time reduction from Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into
its implicational fragment. This reduction proves that Purely Implicational Minimal Logic is PSPACE-
complete. The methods that Statman uses in [17] are based on proof-theory and Natural Deduction in
Prawitz Style. The sub-formula principle for a Natural Deduction system NL for a logic L states that
whenever α is provable from Γ, inL , there is a derivation of α from a set of assumptions {δ1, . . . ,δk} ⊆
Γ built up only with sub-formulas of α and/or {δ1, . . . ,δk}. In this article we show that the Validity
problem for any propositional logic L , with a Natural Deduction system that satisfies the sub-formula
principle, is in PSPACE. Besides that, ifL includes the usual→-rules then PSPACE-complete.
In [13], we can found a general approach to Natural Deduction that allows the definition of general
introduction and elimination rules in a way that, any intuitionistic logical constant (sometimes called
operator or connective) that is expressible in terms of these general rules is also expressible by means of
the intuitionistic logical constants (⊥,→,∧,¬ and ∨). Precisely, in [13] it is shown that any constant c
determined by a set of introduction and elimination rules, in Natural Deduction style, is such that, there is
a formula F(A1, . . . ,Ak) built up with constants from {⊥,→,∧,¬,∨}, and, c(A1, . . . ,Ak) is provable, iff,
F(A1, . . . ,Ak) is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic. In order to prove this statement, namely,
the functional completeness of intuitionistic logical constants, some proof-theoretical assumptions on
the relationship between elimination and introduction rules are considered. Precisely, these assumptions
have to do with the inversion principle that roughly states that an elimination rule for a logical constant
c has to be a function of respective introduction rules of this c. This means that the elimination rule is
only determined by the introduction rules and this inversion principle1.
1A good discussion on the form of the inversion principle can be found in [14]
2 Propositional logics complexity
Although strongly based on [13], the results shown here, do not explicitly need inversion principle.
We do use a general form of introduction and elimination rules proposed in [13] and after extended by
Roy Dickhoff and Nissim Francez to the term general-elimination harmony, such that, there is only one
c-elimination rule associated to the many c-introduction rules. As we see in Section 2, this general-
elimination harmony assumption is not needed, indeed. In [14] there is a very good discussion on the
Higher-Level rules, proposed in [15] as an alternative and extension of Prawitz [13], and the general-
elimination harmony as well. To sum it up , our technique relies in the sub-formula property only,
as it is stated in the Definition 4 in the following section. We have to mention that [1] also provides an
approach that does not require a full harmony between introduction and elimination rules, but [1] does not
have the same goal as ours, in providing a computational complexity analysis based on proof-theoretical
arguments as ours.
2 Translating a propositional logicL into M→
Consider a propositional logic L with Natural Deduction system having introduction and elimination
rules according to the following general schema. A c-introduction rule, as shown in Figure 1, de-
rives c(β1, . . . ,βn,φ 11 , . . . ,φ 1j1 , . . . ,φ
n
1 , . . . ,φ
n
j1 ,γ1, . . . ,γm), discharging occurrences of the bracket formulas
[φ i1], . . . , [φ
i
ji ] in the respective derivation of βi. For reasons of readability, we sometimes write c(βi,φ
j,γk)
as a shortened (abbreviation) of c(β1, . . . ,βn,φ 11 , . . . ,φ 1j1 , . . . ,φ
n
1 , . . . ,φ
n
j1 ,γ1, . . . ,γm)
2. An elimination rule,
corresponding to the same operator c is shown in Figure 2 below. It is important to say that the discharg-
ing discipline is liberal, that is, when applying a rule, it is possible to discharge multiple assumptions
including vacuous discharges. In this way, this general schema cannot be used with sub-structural log-
ics like Relevance and Linear Logics. It is also important to note that each φ ij determine the type of
the formula that can be discharged, not an instance of formula. For example, when representing the
→-introduction rule, there is only one type φ 11 and c(β1,φ 11 ) is φ 11 → β1. The →-intro rule is shown in
Figure 3 below as an instance of the general schema.
[φ 11 ], . . . , [φ 1j1 ]
|
β1 . . .
[φ n1 ], . . . , [φ
n
jn ]
|
βn
c(β1, . . . ,βn,φ 11 , . . . ,φ 1j1 , . . . ,φ
n
1 , . . . ,φ
n
j1 ,γ1, . . . ,γm)
Figure 1: c-introduction rule schema
c(βi,φ j) (φ ji )i, j
[β1]
| . . .
χ
[βn]
. . . |
χ
χ
Figure 2: c-elimination rules schemata
2Consider usual ∨-intro rules. Both have β1 ∨ β2 as conclusion, one has β1 as premise and the other has β2 as the only
premise. According to our schema, β2 plays the role of γ1 in the first rule, while β1 plays this role in the second ∨-intro rule
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[φ 11 ]
|
β1
φ 11 → β1
Figure 3: →-introduction as an instance of the general schema
In elimination rules (see Figure 2), φ ji , i = 1, ji, are called simple-minor premise, for each j. The
premises χ are called discharging minor premises (d-minor premise). The premise c(βi,φ j) is the ma-
jor premise of the elimination rule. There may be more than one introduction rule, but at most one
elimination rule. This elimination rule has one discharging minor premise for each introduction rule.
As a matter of illustration we show below how the usual →-elim rule is seen as instance of a general
elimination schema. In order to see that, remember that the usual (minimal) implication has only one in-
troduction rule that can be easily seen as an instance of an introduction schema. The elimination schema
consider this instance of introduction schema, resulting in the shown rule. The usual form of the→-elim
is obtained by proving B instead of discharging it. For a more detailed explanation on these general rules,
we recommend [13].
A→ B A
[B]
|
C
C
Besides intuitionistic logic, some modal classical logics have Natural Deduction systems that con-
forms with our schema. For example, the Natural Deduction system presented in [12], page 75, for the
logics S4 and S5 can be viewed as instances of our schemata, considering additional provisos for en-
suring the soundness of the respective system. The rule for the -introduction has no proviso and is as
follows.
A
A
The -elimination rule has a proviso, stated below, and it is as follows:
A
A
|
B
B
where: (1) For S4, in the proof of the minor premise B, B only depends on formulas α or ¬α , but
the formula occurrences A discharged by the rule (2) For S5, in the proof of the minor premise B, B only
depends on formulas α , α ,¬α , ¬α , but the formula occurrences A discharged by the rule.
4 Propositional logics complexity
In abstract proof-theory, we would require that the principle of inversion holds concerning the elim-
ination and introduction rules. This usually is among the requirements to have a normalization theorem
holding for a Natural Deduction system. However, for our analysis, nothing is required but the sub-
formula principle, defined in Definition 4.
A logical constant c, also called operator, can be a propositional connective or a modality. A Natural
Deduction system for a logic L is a set of introduction and/or elimination rules for the operators of
L . Given a Natural Deduction system NL for a logic , the usual notions of derivation and proof of
a formula from a set of assumptions are considered in this article. It is worth observing the difference
between formula and formula occurrence.
Definition 1 (Linked formulas and sequences) Let NL be a Natural Deduction for L . Let Π be a
derivation of a formula α from a set of assumptions Γ inNL . Let β1 and β2 be two formula occurrences
in Π. We say that β1 is linked to β2, if and only if, there is a sequence δ0, . . . ,δk of formula occurrences
in Π, such that: (1) δ0 is β1 and δk is β2, and, for each i = 0, . . . ,k− 1; (2) δi is major premise of an
application of a c-elim rule, in Π, and δi+1 is a formula occurrence discharged by this application of
elimination rule, or; (3) δi is a discharging minor premise of an application of a c-elim rule, in Π, and
δi+1 is its conclusion, or; (4) δi is a premise of an application of a c-intro rule, in Π, and δi+1 is its
conclusion.
We call δ0, . . . ,δk a linking-sequence in Π. Observing the definition above, we note that a formula
occurrence that is either a simple-minor premise of an application of a c-elim rule in Π or the conclusion
ofΠ cannot be linked to any other formula occurrence inΠ any more. Thus, the longest possible linking-
sequences in any derivation Π have δk as a simple-minor premise or the conclusion of Π. Our definition
of linking-sequence is similar, and generalizes, the definition of branches as stated in [12].
Definition 2 Let Π be a derivation in NL . Consider a linking-sequence δ0, . . . ,δk in Π. We say that
δ0, . . . ,δk is a sub-formula linking-sequence, if and only if, for every i = 0, . . . ,k, either δi is sub-formula
of δi+1, or, δi+1 is sub-formula of δi.
Definition 3 (Derivations satisfying the Sub-Formula Property) LetL be a logic andNL a Natural
Deduction system forL . Let Π be a derivation of α from {δ1, . . . ,δk} inNL . We say that Π satisfy the
sub-formula principle, if and only if, every linking-sequence in Π is a sub-formula linking-sequence and
every formula occurring in this linking-sequence is either a sub-formula of α or sub-formula of some of
the formulas in Γ.
Definition 4 (Systems satisfying the Sub-Formula Property) We say that a systemNL satisfy the sub-
formula property, if and only if, for every derivation Π of α from Γ in it, there is a derivation Π′ of α
from Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfying the sub-formula property.
When a logicL has a systemNL satisfying the sub-formula property, we say that the logicL itself
satisfies the sub-formula property. Thus, it is important to emphasize that to satisfy the sub-formula
property means that the logic has a Natural Deduction system according the general rules shown here.
This also means that sub-structural logics do not satisfy our notion of sub-formula property.
Proposition 1 Let Π be a derivation satisfying the sub-formula principle. If Π′ is a sub-derivation of Π
then Π′ satisfies the sub-formula principle too.
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Proof of proposition. We observe that a sub-sequence of a linking-sequence that is a sub-formula
linking-sequence is a sub-formula linking-sequence too. Since every linking-sequence of Π is a sub-
formula linking sequence, then every linking sequence of Π′ is a linking sequence too.
Q.E.D.
In what follows we define a translation ? from L into M→ , such that, α is provable in L , if and
only if, α? is provable in M→ . In order to define ?, we need auxiliary functions M and A , defined in
the sequel. In the following definition, pω is a notation used to uniquely identify the symbol p indexed
by the string (word) ω . It this way we ensure that p is the unique propositional symbol that is named
by means of the word ω , such that, pω1 and pω2 are equal, if and only if, ω1 and ω2 are the same word
(string). We remember that we call operator any propositional connective or modality. We consider that
the logic L has a finite set {c1, . . . ,ck} of operators. For reasons of readability, we do not consider
the minimal implication → in this set, even in the case that the logic has it as one of its propositional
connectives. As we will see, the implication is the only logical constant (operator) that is not translated.
So, in what follows we consider only logics including the purely minimal implicational logic.
The propositional logics considered in this article have in their Natural Deduction systems the usual
→-intro and→-elim rules.
The following definitions provide us axioms schemata concerning each c-introduction and/or c-
elimination rule.
Definition 5 (ι-axiom) Consider an introduction rule r for an operator c as shown in Figure 1. The ι-
axiom concerning this rule schema r instantiated to formulas βi and φ i1, . . . ,φ
i
ji , denoted by ι(r,βi,φ
j,γk),
is the following implicational formula:
(φ 11 → (. . .→ (φ 1j1 → β1)))→ . . .(φ n1 → (. . .→ (φ njn → βn)))→ pc(βi,φ j,γk))
Definition 6 (ε-axiom) Consider a formula χ of a logic L and an elimination rule r for c, as shown
right in Figure 2 instantiated to φ j, βi and χ . The ε-axiom concerning this rule schema and χ , denoted
by ε(r,χ,βi,φ j), is the following implicational formula:
φ 11 → (. . .(φ njn → (..(β1→ χ)→ . . .(βn→ χ)→ (pc(βi,φ j)→ χ))))
For example, considering the usual ∨-introduction (∨− intro1 and ∨− intro2) and ∨-elimination
(∨−elim) natural deduction schemata, we have that: (1) ι(∨− intro1,β1,β2) is β1→ p∨(β1,β2); (2) ι(∨−
intro2,β1,β2) is β2→ p∨(β1,β2), and; (3) ε(∨−elim,β1,β2,χ) is (β1→ χ)→ ((β2→ χ)→ (p∨(β1,β2)→
χ)).
Definition 7 (Atomizing Operators) The mapping M from the language of L into the one of M→ is
defined inductively, as follows: AtomsM (p) = p, if p is a propositional letter; ImplicationM (α1→
α2) =M (α1)→M (α2); OperatorsM (cm(βi,φ j,γk)) = pcm(βi,φ j,γk), if cm is an operator ofL .
The second clause in the definition above is only used when the language ofL includes the minimal
implication →. Otherwise it is not used and the translation is also well-defined. In the following we
define an auxiliary function that for each formula α yields the set of implicational formulas that express
the “deductive meaning”3 of the elimination and introduction rules for each operator inL .
3This informal expression is made precise in the statement of Theorem 1
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Definition 8 (Axiomatizing Operators) Given a formula α inL , the mapping A α from the language
ofL into (finite) sets of formulas in the language of M→ is defined inductively, as follows.
• Atoms A α(p) = /0;
• Implication A α(α1→ α2) =A α(α1)∪A α(α2);
• Operators A α(cm(βi,φ j,γk)) =
{ι(r,M (βi),M (φ j),M (γk))/r is a cm-intro rule}
∪
{ε(r,M (χ),M (βi),M (φ j))/r is a cm-elim rule and χ ∈ sub(α)}
Lemma 1 Let L be a logic having a Natural Deduction system satisfying sub-formula property. Let Π
be a proof of α from Γ in L . There is a derivation Π′ of M (α) from Γ′ ⊆M (Γ)∪⋃γ∈ΓA γ(Γ,α)∪
A α(Γ,α) in M→ . We use the notation A α(Γ) to denote
⋃
γ∈ΓA α(γ) and “Γ,α” to denote Γ∪{α}.
Proof of Lemma. SinceL satisfies the sub-formula principle, we can consider that Π is a derivation
satisfying the sub-formula principle. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of this derivation. The
basis is the derivation of α from α itself, and hence, Π′ is M (α) only. The inductive step is according
the last rule applied in the derivation satisfying the sub-formula principle. There are only two (general)
cases:
• Last rule is a cm-intro rule. Then Π is as following:
[φ 11 ], . . . , [φ 1j1 ]
Π?1
β1 . . .
[φ n1 ], . . . , [φ
n
jn ]
Π?n
βn
c(β1, . . . ,βn,φ 11 , . . . ,φ 1j1 , . . . ,φ
n
1 , . . . ,φ
n
j1 ,γ1, . . . ,γm)
Where the last rule is r, a c-introduction rule. Consider ι(r,βi,φ j,γk) the implicational formula
related to c. By Proposition 1Π?i satisfies the sub-formula principle, i= 1,n. By inductive hypoth-
esis, for each i = 1,n, there is a derivation Π′i satisfying the statement of the lemma. Each Π′i is of
the following form.
[M (φ i1)], . . . , [M (φ
i
ji)]
Π′i
M (βi)
Thus, for each i we can build, from Π′i, a derivation as the following, which we will denote by Σi.
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[M (φ i1)], . . . , [M (φ
i
ji)]
Π′i
M (βi)→-i
M (φ iji)→M (βi)
M (φ iji−1)→ (M (φ iji)→M (βi))
...
(M (φ i1)→ (. . .→ (M (φ iji)→M (βi))..))
Finally, the derivation below is a derivation in M→ of the form stated by the lemma, that is,
of M (c(β1, . . . ,βn,φ 11 , . . . ,φ 1j1 , . . . ,φ
n
1 , . . . ,φ
n
j1 ,γ1, . . . ,γm)) = pc(βi,φ j,γk). For reasons of space we
abbreviate (M (φ i1)→ (. . .→ (M (φ iji)→M (βi))..)) by Bi.
[M (φ n1 )], . . . , [M (φ
n
jn)]
Σn
Bn
[M (φ 21 )], . . . , [M (φ 2j2)]
Σ2
B2
[M (φ 11 )], . . . , [M (φ 1j1)]
Σ1
B1 ι(r,M (βi),M (φ j),M (γk))
B2→ (B3→ . . .(Bn→ pc(βi,φ j,γk)))
B3→ . . .(Bn→ pc(βi,φ j,γk))
...
...
...
...
Bn→ pc(βi,φ j,γk)
pc(βi,φ j,γk)
The derivation above shows the existence of a derivation of the translated conclusion from the
translated premises.
• Last rule is a cm-elim rule. Then Π? is as following:
Π?pm
c(βi,φ j)
Π?i, j
(φ ji )i, j
[β1]
Π?1
χ . . .
[βn]
Π?n
χ
χ
By Proposition 1 Π?pm, Π?i, j and Π?i , i = 1,n, j = 1,k satisfies the sub-formula principle. By
inductive hypothesis, for each i (and j), there are derivations Π′i, Π′i, j and Π′pm satisfying the
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statement of the lemma. Using, for each i and j the derivations Π′i, j we obtain the following
derivation from the ε-axiom ε(r,M (χ),M (βi),ϕi, j).
Π′n, jn
M (φnjn )
Π′1,2
M (φ12 )
Π′1,1
M (φ11 ) M (φ
1
1 )→ (. . .(M (φnjn )→ (..(M (β1)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi,φ j)→M (χ)))))
M (φ12 )→ (. . .(M (φnjn )→ (..(M (β1)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi ,φ j)→M (χ)))))
M (φ13 )→ (. . .(M (φnjn )→ (..(M (β1)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi ,φ j)→M (χ)))
...
...
...
...
M (φnjn )→ (..M (β1)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi ,φ j)→M (χ)))
(M (β1)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi,φ j)→M (χ)))
We denote the derivation above by Σ. Using Π′i, for each i, we have the following derivation.
[M (βi)]
Π′i
M (χ)
M (βi)→M (χ)
Then the derivation below, built using the above derivations, shows how to conclude the transla-
tion of the conclusion of Π? from the translation of its premises and the implicational introduction
and elimination schemata. ε(r,M (χ),M (βi),ϕi, j) is the ε-axiom that implements the implica-
tional elimination on the implicational fragment of minimal logic. We remind the reader that
M (c(βi,φ j)) is pc(βi,φ j). We can check and find out that the derivation satisfies the lemma.
Π′pm
pc(βi,φ j)
[M (βn)]
Π′n
M (βn)→M (χ)
[M (β1)]
Π′1
M (β1)→M (χ)
Σ
(M (β1)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi ,φ j)→M (χ))
(M (β2)→M (χ))→ . . .(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi,φ j)→M (χ))
...
...
(M (βn)→M (χ))→ (pc(βi ,φ j)→M (χ))
pc(βi ,φ j)→M (χ)
M (χ)
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Q.E.D.
For logics that have rules with a proviso, the respective implicational axioms ι and ε must reflect the
corresponding conditions. Whenever we have these axioms we have Lemma 1 holding for the respective
logics. For example, this can be done with the Natural Deduction rules provided in [12] for S4 and S5
and already discussed before in this article.
Proposition 2 LetL be a propositional logic satisfying the sub-formula principle. Consider the follow-
ing translation ? from formulas of L into formulas of M→ : Let A α(α) be {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk} α? is defined
as ϕ1→ (ϕ2→ . . .(ϕk→M (α))). Thus, `L α if and only if `M→ α?.
Proof of proposition. The proposition follows immediately from Lemma 1.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 If α is any propositional formula, then the number of sub-formulas of α is polynomially
bounded on the length of α .
Proof. Each sub-formula of α is determined by the main connective of it. In α there is at most
one connective or logical constant by symbol position in α . Thus, the number of sub-formulas of α is
bounded by the length of α .
We can see that the size of α? is O(m3), if m is the size of α . The formula α? depends on three
choices of sub-formulas of α . This polynomial bound on the size of α? entails the following main
conclusions of our article.
Theorem 1 IfL satisfies the sub-formula principle then the problem of knowing whether α , a formula
ofL , is provable or not, is in PSPACE. IfL includes M→ then this problem, also known as Validity,
is PSPACE-complete.
Proof of theorem. From the PSPACE-completeness of provability in M→ and the polynomial re-
duction of L L to M→ , we have that Validity in L , namely, knowing whether α , a formula of L , is
provable or not, is in PSPACE. If L includes M→ , and since M→ is PSPACE-complete, then Validity
is PSPACE-complete.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 If L satisfies the sub-formula principle and includes M→ then the problem of knowing
whether α , a formula ofL , is invalid or not, is PSPACE-complete.
Proof of corollary. Since PSPACE is a deterministic class, we have that CoPSPACE=PSPACE. The
problem stated in the corollary is in CoPSPACE, by definition.
Q.E.D.
3 A brief discussion on extending the results to finitely many-valued propo-
sitional logics
An stronger version of the statement of Theorem 1 can be used to prove that some finitely many-valued
logics have Validity (cf. Theorem 1) in PSPACE. In [5] it is provided a general schema to define normal-
izable Natural Deduction systems for some finitely many-valued logics. The kind of Natural Deduction
rules used in [5] are similar, in fact almost the same, to those shown here in this article. However, when
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formalizing logics with more than 2 truth-values, auxiliary formulas are considered in order to perform
the binary print, explained in sequel, of a truth-value. We briefly discuss here the main idea on an exten-
sion of Theorem 1 and how it could be used to prove that Validity/Provability in a finitely many-valued
logic is in PSPACE, by adjusting the sub-formula principle defined in Definition 4. More details on the
Natural Deduction systems for finitely many-valued logics as used here can be found in [5].
Instead of defining a rule for each of the n > 2 truth-values, it is used a method to reduce many-
valued semantics to bivalent one. We use the three-valued logic Ł3, due to Łukasiewicz to illustrate our
discussion. See [4] for the original article (1920) on Ł3 and [9] for a very good and concise presentation
of many-valued logics.
The truth-values in Ł3 are {0, i,1}, where 0 and i are undesignated values and 1 is the designated
value. With the sake of providing some context on the meaning of these three values, we can say that the
truth-value i means indetermination or in numerical terms that it corresponds4 to 1/2. Thus, a formula
having i as value should not be taken as a true formula. The truth-values i and 0 in this case are considered
as undesignated. For some many-valued logics, a formula is valid, iff, it yields designated value for each
possible truth-value assignment. This is just the case with Ł3. Ł3 has the truth-table shown in Table 4
for the implication→ and in Table 5 for the negation ¬. We explain what is a bitprint of a truth-value
in the sequel. Consider a function t(P) that yields 1 if P is designated and 0 if it is undesignated. Using
the formula φ(P), defined as ¬P→ P, it is possible to identify i with the pair 〈0,1〉, 1 with the pair 〈1,1〉
and 0 with 〈0,0〉, that is, each truth-value x is identified by the pair 〈t(x),φ(x)〉. In [10], the sequence
〈P,φ(P)〉 that denotes each one of the values in {0, i,1} is called the bitprint of the respective truth-
value. It is interesting to note that the pair 〈1,0〉 has no truth-value associated to it. Besides that, it is
worth observing that for a many-valued logic with k truth-values, we have to find maxint(log2(k))− 1
separating formulas for performing the role of φ(P). Using bitprints, the truth-table of the ⊃ is as shown
in Table 6. In this way the line of the truth-table saying that P ⊃ Q yields 1, when P is i and Q is 1, is
coded as: P is 0, φ(P) is 1, Q is 1 and φ(Q) is 1. This line, the fourth line of the truth-table, is related to
the Natural Deduction rule shown in Figure 7. The rule in Figure 8, very similar to an elimination rule
in Natural Deduction, corresponds to the third line in Table 6. Because some pairs 〈t(P),φ(P)〉 do not
correspond to any truth-value, there is need of a Natural Deduction rule to take care of this. The rule that
is related to the pair 〈1,0〉 in Ł3 is shown in Figure 9. Besides that, rules as shown in Figure 10, are need
in order to have a complete system, for, in the general case, formulas of the form φ(X), may have X as
composed formulas. Figure 10 shows the case when X is P→ Q. This is the case related to the first line
of the truth-table in Figure 6.
Consider a general propositional connective c, that forms formulas of the form c(A1, . . . ,An). The
rules that discharge c(A1, . . . ,An) are considered c-introduction rules. The rules that have c(A1, . . . ,An) as
premise (also called major premise) are the c-elimination rules. The same is said about φ(c(A1, . . . ,An)),
where φ is a separating formula. In [5] it is shown how to eliminate sequences that starts with c-intro
rules and ends with c-elimination rules. Derivations having this kind of sequences are said to be non-
normal. Normal derivations do not have these sequences, and, do not have c-rules, like the one shown
in Figure 9, proving premise of c-elimination rules either. It is the case that any non-normal derivation
of a formula α from a set of formulas Γ can be effectively transformed in a normal derivation of α from
Γ′ ⊆ Γ. This is the statement of the normalization theorem for finitely many-valued logics proved in [5].
A branch in a derivation in a Natural Deduction system for a finitely many-valued logic, as those
discussed in this section, is any sequence of formulas starting in an undischarged hypothesis and ending
in the minor premise of an elimination rule. This is essentially what is stated in Definition 1. One of the
4This depends whether we are in an epistemic position, the former, or an ontic position, the later case.
E.H. Haeusler 11
P Q P⊃ Q
1 1 1
1 i i
1 0 0
i 1 1
i i 1
i 0 i
0 1 1
0 i 1
0 0 1
Figure 4: Truth-table for ⊃ in Ł3
P ¬P
1 0
i i
0 1
Figure 5: Truth-table for ¬ in Ł3
P Q P⊃ Q t(P) φ(P) t(Q) φ(Q) t(P⊃ Q) φ(P⊃ Q)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 i i 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
i i 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
i 0 i 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 i 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Figure 6: Truth-table for ⊃ in Ł3 using bitprints in the 6 last columns
[P⊃ Q]
...
C
[P]
...
C φ(P) Q φ(Q)
C
Figure 7: ⊃-introduction rule for the logic Ł3 related to the fourth line in Figure 6
properties of normal derivations is that for any branch starting with a formula A and ending with B in
this derivation, the formulas that occur in it are either sub-formulas of A, or B, or both. This is one of the
main features of normal proofs, in usual systems as Classical, Intuitionistic and Minimal logic. As was
already mentioned in the introduction, normalization implies in the sub-formula property in many logics.
A quick inspection on the form of the general Natural Deduction introduction and elimination rules as
defined in Section 2 shows that for these rules the premises are either sub-formula of the conclusion or
vice-versa. The discharged formulas of both, introduction and elimination are also sub-formula either of
the major premise or of the conclusion. In fact, the sub-formula principle holds because of this feature
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[P]
...
C
[φ(P)]
...
C Q φ(Q) P⊃ Q
C
Figure 8: ⊃-elimination-like rule for the logic Ł3 related to the third line in Figure 6
P
[φ(P)]
...
C
C
Figure 9: ⊃-rule for the logic Ł3 related to the value 〈1,0〉 that is not a bitprint
[P]
...
C
[φ(P)]
...
C
[Q]
...
C
[φ(Q)]
...
C
[φ(P⊃ Q)]
...
C
C
Figure 10: φ(⊃)-intro rule in Ł3 regard to φ(P⊃ Q) and first line in Figure 6
just discussed. However, the format of the Natural Deduction rules for the finitely many-valued logics
does not show this perfect relationship. In their case, the use of the separating formulas φ(X) disturbs this
relationship based only on sub-formula occurrence in rules. In order to apply our technique to finitely
many-valued logic, we will consider the sub-formula relationship through application of any formula
in the set of separating formulas {φ1, . . . ,φn}, so that the relationship between conclusions , premises
and discharged formulas, in this case of Natural Deduction rule, includes the separating formulas. For
example, P, the discharged formula, and Q, a minor premise, are sub-formulas of the major premise
P ⊃ Q, of the rule in Figure 8. However, φ(P), a discharged formula, and φ(Q), other minor premise,
are not sub-formulas. They are, in fact, images of sub-formulas of the major premise. So, we can say
that the formulas occurrences in a Natural Deduction rule, as in Figure 8, are φ -related. This is defined
below.
Definition 9 Consider a Natural Deduction rule in a system for finitely many-valued logic using a set
Φ= {φ1, . . . ,φn} of separating formulas. The relationship between premises, conclusions and discharged
formulas under sub-formula of φi, i = 1,n, image of a sub-formula is denoted by Φ-sub-formula rela-
tionship.
It is a trivial fact that if Φ ⊆ Φ′ and α is Φ-sub-formula of β , or vice-versa, then they are Φ′-sub-
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formula too. From the form of a branch beginning with β1 and ending in βk in a normal derivation we
can see that any formula in this branch is either a sub-formula of β1 or of βn, and for any i = 1,n− 1,
βi is Φ-sub-formula of βi+1, or vice-versa. Using this, we can use the same polynomial simulation used
for proving Theorem 1 for any finitely many-valued logic in M→ . It is worth noting that the conclusion
and hypothesis of any normal derivation impose that the set of formulas that occur in it are either sub-
formulas of the conclusion or of the hypothesis. Does not matter the fact that some of then are Φ-images
of some other sub-formula.
As a matter of illustration of the discussion in the last paragraph, we show the implicational schemata
for the elimination, introduction and φ -rules, including the φ -rules related to no bitprint representation
(as the one shown in Figure 9). For example, in the case of Ł3, the implicational schema for the rule
shown in Figure 7 is below, where C is a sub-formula of either the conclusion α of the derivation, or
of some hypothesis of the derivation. There must be one such formula for each C, this already includes
the images under the separating formula φ . We remember that p(P⊃Q) is the new (fresh) propositional
variable associated to P⊃ Q. The same holds for the propositional variables pφ(P) and pφ(Q)
(p(P⊃Q)→C)→ ((P→C)→ (pφ(P)→ (Q→ (pφ(Q)→C))))
The formula below is the implicational schema for the corresponding φ -introduction rule in Figure 10.
(P→C)→ ((pφ(P)→C)→ ((Q→C)→ ((pφ(Q)→C)→ ((p(P⊃Q)→C)→C))))
The implicational schema for the⊃-elimination rule (Figure 8) and the rule shown in Figure 10 are show
in the sequel.
(P→C)→ ((pφ(P)→C)→ (Q→ (pφ(Q)→ (p(P⊃Q)→C))))
P→ ((pφ(P)→C)→C)
Important Observation: The reader must have noted that the forms of the implicational schemata
are not totally in formal agreement with the ι-axioms presented in the previous sections and used to prove
that Validity of the respective logic is in PSPACE. This is only a formal disagreement, indeed. This can
be seen, if we consider the usual conjunction ∧. The ∧ very well-known introduction rules is the left rule
below, but it can be also defined as drawn by the right rule.
A B
A∧B
A B
[A∧B]
...
C
C.
Finally, from the proof-theoretical results obtained in [5] we can state the following theorem. A
detailed proof of this theorem and a more systematic treatment of the subject discussed in this section is
omitted due to the lack of space.
Theorem 2 Let L be a propositional k-valued logic with finitely-many connectives with semantics de-
termined by functional truth-tables. The Validity decision problem forL is in PSPACE.
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Proof. The fact that the connectives are defined by functional truth-tables, i.e. deterministic and
defined for every k-value truth-tables, entails that the Natural Deduction system is sound and complete
regarding the semantics provided by the truth-tables. Consider the set {φ1, . . . ,φlog2(k)} of separating
formulas that provide bitprints for each of the k truth-values. There is at most one rule for each line
in each truth-value. Since the number of lines in each truth-table is fixed (depends only on k), there
is at most one implicational schema for each line. Let F(k) be this number. F(k) depends only on
k. In fact F(k) is induced by the arity of each connective of the language of L . Taking into account
a formula α in the language of L . Each implicational schema depends also on the number of sub-
formulas of α , including those sub-formulas that are image under each φi. Let us say that n is the number
of sub-formulas of the formula α , that is linear on the size of α . Thus, the total number of implicational
schemata is at most na?log2(k), where a=F(k). This upper-bound is polynomial in n. Thus, the translation
used in Theorem 1 can the used here to prove that Validity is in PSPACE. It is worth noting that F(k)
depends only on the logic.
Q.E.D.
If the Validity of a logic L is in PSPACE and it includes M→ then its (Validity decision problem)
is PSPACE-complete. A logicL includes M→ , iff, the→-intro and→-elim are derived rules inL .
4 Conclusion
We have shown that structural propositional logics satisfying the sub-formula principle have their prov-
ability problem in PSPACE and that if they include M→ then they are PSPACE-complete problems. We
used proof-theory to show this. An important consequence of our result is to show that some logics
hardly satisfy the sub-formula principle in the terms here presented. Any propositional logic that we
believe that it is beyond PSPACE cannot satisfy the sub-formula principle.
An immediate application of Theorem 1 shows that hardly some well-known logics, as Propositional
Dynamic Logic (PDL, see [6]) and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents [7],
have Natural Deduction systems satisfying the sub-formula principle. In [8], for example, it is shown a
Natural Deduction system for PDL, with normalization theorem. However, one of its rules, the iteration
rule, does not satisfy the sub-formula principle in the terms stated in this article, since it is an infinitary
ND-system. Anyway it does not satisfy sub-formula relationship between premises and conclusion either.
Any logic that is EXPTIME-complete, as the ones just discussed, cannot satisfy the sub-formula principle
too.
Any PSPACE-complete problem is NP-Hard. Since Classical propositional Logic can be specified
using the general elimination and introduction rules presented here, then it is PSPACE-HARD and so its
also NP-Hard. We know, by the truth-table method that Classical propositional logic is in NP, so it is
NP-complete.
We discussed the extension of this proof-theoretical way of providing upper-bounds for provability
to finitely many-valued logics, concluding that their respective provability (validity) problems are in
PSPACE. This is in our opinion the far we can go. The fact that the set of valid formulas of a logic is in
PSPACE may be of no help in some particular analysis. There are many-valued logics, as for example
Kleene’s logic, that have no tautologies and this is of course trivially in PSPACE. On the other hand,
knowing that many-valued usual logics are in PSPACE seems to be an interesting fact in general. There
are finitely many-valued logics that have non-trivial set of tautologies. As far as we know there should be
no novelty in proving that Validity in finitely many-valued logics is in PSPACE. A polynomially space-
bounded algorithm for testing Validity can be designed by observing that evaluating the truth-value of
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a formula is polynomial on the size of the formula and that the evaluation of other rows can reuse the
space. Here we presented an alternative proof of the fact that Validity is in PSPACE. The interesting part
is to conclude that if the logic includes M→ , then its Validity is PSPACE-complete.
4.1 Further investigation
We have to consider the known PSPACE-complete propositional logics. The best well-known are the
Modal Logics K, S4, and KD.We know that (unlabeled) Natural Deduction systems for these logics are
problematic. They fail to satisfy normalization and have rules with complex provisos. A consequence of
this is that the natural reductions expected to work according the inversion principle produce derivations
out of the system. Thus, the application of our technique to these logics depends on a concrete Natural
Deduction system with rules that are instances of the general rules we deal with. Anyway, we already
know, by other methods that these logics are PSPACE-complete, so this application would not be worth
of presenting. However, there are labeled Natural Deduction systems with normalization theorem and a
related sub-formula lemma.
For logics that we do not know the complexity class of the provability problem, the extension of the
technique presented in this article to the a kind of general labeled introduction and elimination system
of rules would be worth of developing. Our general form for introduction and elimination rules does
not consider the many approaches of labeled Natural Deduction. It is our intention to discuss how
Theorem 1 can be also obtained for the usual labeled systems used to specify modal logics, namely, [11],
[16] and finally [2]. This would be quite useful in providing a proof-theoretical complexity analysis for
the intuitionistic versions of Modal Logics.
Extending this technique to first-order logics would be interesting too. There are decidable fragments
of pure predicate (without functions and the equality “=”) that are beyond PSPACE, and surely the
statement of the sub-formula principle for these cases are worth of studying. Finally, investigations
concerning the feasibility of the interpolant (see [3]) and the existence of ND provers with sub-formula
property are worth of studying too.
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